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Summary
:
Since 1970 there have been three major changes in the commission fee structure
for stock transactions in the United States. The last change in May, 1975
eliminated all formal fee schedules and dictated that the commission charges on
all transactions would be completely negotiated. Many observers have speculated
regarding the probable effect of this change to competitive commission on the
several regional stock exchanges. This study sets forth the alternative hypo-
theses in this regard and examines the relative trading volume on the national
and regional stock exchanges for the period 1970 through 1977. The results are
best described as mixed, but tend to indicate that the regional stock exchanges
as a group have survived this period of significant change.
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NEGOTIATED COMMISSIONS AND REGIONAL STOCK EXCHANGES*
Frank K. Reilly
Gladys Perry**
INTRODUCTION
The formal equity exchanges in the United States are typically broken
down into two major divisions. The first group are the two national stock
exchanges—the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) and the American Stock Ex-
change (ASE). The second group are the regional stock exchanges located in
several large cities outside New York (i.e., Boston, Chicago, Philadelphia,
etc.). The regional stock exchanges are an important part of our total
capital allocation process because they provide an exchange market for the
stock of many small firms that would not qualify for listing on one of
the national exchanges. In addition, they provide added liquidity and an
increase in competitive marketmaking for large firms that are dual listed
on one or more of the regional exchanges In addition to being listed on
one of the national exchanges. Because of dual listing it Is possible
for smaller regional Investment firms to be primary brokers in these
stocks.
The figures in Table 1 indicate that the status of the regional
stock exchanges has varied over the years depending upon investor attitudes
*The authors acknowledge the use of the computer facilities at the
University of Illinois and Northern Illinois University. During part of
the period of this research Professor Reilly was an Associate at the
Center for Advanced Studies at the University of Illinois.
**The authors are Professor of Finance, University of Illinois at
Urbana-Champaign, and Instructor in Finance, Northern Illinois University,
respectively.
It is recognized that all the exchanges are registered as national
exchanges with the Securities and Exchange Commission. Our use of the
term national and regional is in keeping with the prevailing terminology
of most observors.
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TABLE 1
TRADING VOLUME ON NEW YORK STOCK EXCHANGE,
AMERICAN STOCK EXCHANGE AND OTHER EXCHANGES AS A
PERCENT OF TRADING VOLUME ON ALL REGISTERED EXCHANGES
1955 - 1977
(Percent of Total Value; Percent of Total Shares)
NYSE ASE NYSE + ASE Other
fear % Val. % Sh. % Val. % Sh. % Val. % Sh. % Val. % Sh.
L955 86.5
'
67.7 6.8 20.1 93.3 87.8 6.7 12.2
1956 85.1 64.5 7.7 22.3 92.8 86.8 7.2 13.2
L957 85.6 66.8 7.2 21.0 92.8 87.8 7.2 12.2
L958 85.6 70.5 7.3 19.6 92.9 90.1 7.1 9.8
L959 83.8 64.8 9.4 25.1 93.2 89.9 6.8 10.1
L960 83.9 69.0 9.2 21.6 93.1 90.6 6.8 9.3
L961 82.6 64.3 10.6 26.1 93.2 90.4 6.8 9.6
L962 86.5 71.3 6.7 20.0 93.2 91.3 6vS 8.7
L963 85.3 73.5 7.4 18.3 92.7 91.8 7.3 8.2
L964 83.7 72.5 8.2 19.4 91.9 91.9 8.0 8.1
L965 82.0 69.9 9.7 22.5 91.7 92.4 8.3 7.5
L966 80.1 69.2 11.5 22.9 91.6 92.1 8.4 7.9
L967 77.5 64.1 14.3 28.6 91.8 92.7 8.2 •"' 7.3
L968 73.8 62.1 17.7 29.6 91.5 91.7 8.5 8.3
L969 73.9 63.9 17.2 27.0 91.1 90.9 8.9 9.0
L970 78.7 70.8 10.9 19.4 89.6 90.2 10.4 9.8
L971 79.5 72.1 9.6 17.7 89.1 89.8 10.9 10.2
L972 78.3 71.4 10.0 17.5 88.3 89.9 11.7 11.1
L973 82.3 75.7 5.9 12.9 88.2 88.6 11.9 11.4
1974 83.9 79.0 4.3 9.8 88.2 88.8 11.9 11.2
L975 85.2 81.1 3.6 8.7 88.8 89.8 11.2 10.2
L976 84.4 80.3 3.8 9.0 88.2 89.3 11.8 10.7
L977 84.0 79.9 4.6 9.3 88.6 89.2 11.4 10.8
Source: Statistical Bulletin , United States Securities and Exchange
Commission, Vols. 14-28 (1955-1978)'.
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and the market environment. During the mid-1950' s the regional stock ex-
changes prospered because investors were interested in small growth firms.
There was a decline in activity during the 1960's with the trough appar-
ently coming during 1967. Subsequently, there was a fairly steady increase
in the relative trading on the regional exchanges through 1974 followed by
a decline in 1975 and subsequent increases in 1976 and 1977. Most observers
attribute this growth during 1967-1974 to the increase in trading by insti-
tutions on these exchanges because of the fixed commission structure.
Specifically, with the fixed commission structure, the institutions were
looking for ways to either recapture part of these excess charges or to
2
use them to pay for other services. If the growth in trading volume
on the regional stock exchanges during this latter period was because of
the fixed commission structure, a question of primary concern is the
effect of fully negotiated commission rates on these exchanges. We con-
sider this question by examining the trading volume for several of the
regional stock exchanges relative to the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE)
for the period since 1970 with special emphasis on the periods surrounding
changes in the commission structure. Obviously the most critical period
is the period following the infamous "May Day" (May 1, 1975), when com-
missions on all trades became subject to negotiation.
The initial section contains a more detailed discussion of the
reasons for the existence of the regional exchanges and the functions
they serve. The subsequent section discusses the effect of the growth
2
For a detailed discussion of those practices, see Chris Welles,
"The War Between the Big Board and the Regionals," Institutional Investor ,
Vol. 4, No. 12 (December, 1970), pp. 21-27.
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of financial institutions on the regional exchanges and the impact of the
fixed commission structure. The following section contains a statement
of the alternative hypotheses possible regarding the effects that nego-
tiated commissions could have on the regional exchanges. The tests of
the hypotheses are set forth and the results reported in the fourth sec-
tion. The paper ends with a summary and a discussion of the implications
of the results.
FUNCTIONS OF REGIONAL STOCK EXCHANGES
3Regional security exchanges basically serve three functions:
1. The listing of small regional companies that would not qualify
for listing on one of the national securities exchanges—i.e.,
the NYSE or the ASE. Assuming some small firms would like the
prestige and possibly the added liquidity for their stock that
would come from listing on an exchange—they can list on one
of the regional exchanges.
2. The dual listing of large companies that are already listed on
a national exchange. Such dual listing is principally for the
benefit of regional brokerage firms who cannot afford a member-
ship on one of the national exchanges. Under such conditions,
these members of the regional exchange encourage the dual listing
3A more extended discussion on this topic is contained in James E.
Walter, The Role of Regional Security Exchanges (Berkeley: University of
California Press, 1957). There is also a brief history of the regional
exchanges in, Securities and Exchange Commission, Special Study of the
Securities Markets , House Document No. 95, 88th Congress, 2nd session,
(Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1963), part 2.
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of large popular stocks because the regional exchange member-
broker can buy or sell the dual-listed stock for his customers
and derive the full commission. If the stock is not listed on
the regional stock exchange the broker acts through a corres-
pondent who is a member of the national exchange and must share
the commission. Obviously, the more dual listing the better
it is for the regional member-broker.
3. The trading of unlisted stocks of interest to the members of
the regional exchange. In cases where there is substantial
interest in a stock that does not want to become listed on a
regional exchange, the exchange can grant unlisted trading
privileges in the stock to its members.
There has been a change in the proportion of total trading volume on
the regional exchanges that is attributable to trading in regional com-
panies and the percent attributable to trading dual listed stocks. As
shown in Table 2, with the exception of the Los Angeles and San Francisco
Exchanges, the proportion of trading in dual listed stocks grew steadily
from 1944 to 1953. This trend has continued through 1976 to the point
where trading in dual listed stocks is clearly the dominant business for
these exchanges. Notably, the increase in this segment of the regional
stock exchange business (trading in dual listed stocks and stocks granted
unlisted trading privileges) came several years ago
—
before any increase
in institutional trading. Apparently, the increase was due to the growth
of regional brokerage firms that did not have NYSE memberships and the
interest of the regional brokerage house customers in these large dual
listed stocks.
-6-
TABLE 2
RELATIONSHIP OF SHARE VOLUME IN MULTIPLE
TRADED ISSUES TO TOTAL VOLUME
7 REGIONAL EXCHANGES
(in percent)
Exchange 197&b 1953 1952 1948° 1944'
Boston
Detroit
Los Angeles
Midwest
Phil. -Bait.
Pittsburgh
San Francisco
Total
94.4
94.5
82.4
92.0
91.0'
85.0 83.5 82.8 64.2
1
69.6 69.2 56.6 38.7
2
37.1 :i.6 38.8 43.2
69.8 69.3 62.1 49.6
3
91.7 92.6 89.2 83.5
4
54.3 46.5 49.8 43.0
?
i 27.4 25.5 36.9 39.5
54.4 54.0 53.7 50.3
hietroit Stock Exchange closed its doors on June 30, 1976.
"San Francisco and Los Angeles merged effective 12-31-56 as the Pacific
Coast Stock Exchange. It has since changed its name to The Pacific
Stock Exchange, Inc.
Philadelphia-Baltimore (later P-B-W) changed its name to the Philadelphia
Stock Exchange, Inc., on May 10, 1976. The proportion of dually traded
securities is understated as it considers only stocks granted dual trad-
ing privileges. Thus it excludes the trading activity in dually-listed
stocks.
\
Pittsburgh merged with P-B-W elective 12-31-69.
The total represents a weighted average of all dually traded stocks with
respect to total volume trades of cited exchange.
Source: James E. Walter, The hole of Regional Exchanges (Los Angeles:
University of California Press, 1957), p. 24.
Source: The 1976 figures were obtained as follows. The total volume
per exchange was taken frcm the Statistical Bulletin , United
States Securities and Exchange Commission, Vol. XXXVI (1977).
The annual volume of trading in dually listed securities and
stocks granted aual trading privileges was obtained from the
individual exchanges.
-7-
Besides the benefits of dual listing to regional brokerage firms,
several studies that have examined the factors that influence the cost
of liquidity services have found that there is a significant negative
relationship between the cost of liquidity as represented by the bid-ask
spread and the number of competing markets (i.e., the more markets the
smaller the bid-ask spread). Specifically, the initial study in this
4
area by Derasetz considered the number of markets on which a stock was
traded and derived a negative coefficient for the market variable but
it was not statistically significant. A subsequent study by Tinic
likewise included a ~:ariable that measured the competition in market-
making. Rather than simply the number of other markets where the stock
was traded Tinic computed i-he Herf indald. Index of Concentration that in-
dicates the proportion of trading on the NYSE. In this case, if compe-
tition improves the market one would expect a positive relationship
—
i.e., the lower the concentration of trading on the NYSE, the smaller
the spread. The significant positive coefficient results confirmed the
benefits of competition.
A study by Tinic and West examined the cost of dealer services on
the OIC market and also considered the effect of competing marketmakers
.
Harold Demsetz., "The. Cost of Transacting," Quarterly Journal of
Economics , Vol. 82, No. 1 (February, 1968), pp. 33-53.
Seha M. Tinicj "The Economics of Liquidity Services," Quarterly
Journal of Fconcaics , Vol. 86, No, 1 (February, 1972), pp. 79-93.
Seha. M. Tinic and Richard R. West, "Competition and the Pricing
of Dealer Service in the Over-the-Counter Stock Market," Journal of
Financial and Quantitative Analysis
, Vol. 7, No. 3 (June, 1972), pp.
1707-1726.
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by examining the relationship between the bid-ask spread and the number
of dealers making a market in the stock. The significant negative coef-
ficient supported the benefits of competition. A subsequent study by
Benston and Hagerman likewise examined the determinants of the spread
for OTC stocks and considered the effect of the number of dealers. The
coefficient for the number of dealers was negative and significant indi-
cating that increased competition reduces the spread.
Branch and Freed considered five variables to explain the percent
spread for a sample of stocks on the NYSE and the American Stock Exchange
(ASE) . One of the variables included was the number of exchanges where
the security is traded as a measure of the amount of competition. For
the stocks on the NYSE, the coefficient for the number of exchanges was
9
significant and negative. Finally, a study by Hamilton examined the
relationship between the dealer spread and the number of exchanges for
a sample of NYSE stocks and a comparable sample of OTC stocks. Again,
the results indicated a negative relationship between the spread and the
number of markets.
In summary, the several studies on the determinants of marketmakers
bid-ask spread have consistently indicated a strong negative relationship
George J. Benston and Robert L. Hagerman, "Determinants of Bid-Ask
Spreads in the Over-the-Counter Market," Journal of Financial Economics
,
Vol. 1, No. 4 (December, 1974), pp. 353-364.
g
Ben Branch and Walter Freed, "Bid-Ask Spreads on the AMEX and the
Big Board," Journal of Finance , Vol. 32, No. 1 (March, 1977), pp. 159-163.
9James L. Hamilton, "Competition, Scale Economics, and Transaction
Cost in the Stock Market," Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis ,
Vol. 11, No. 5 (December, 1976), pp. 779-802.
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between the spread and the number of competing marketmakers as measured
by the number of exchange markets for listed stocks or the number of
dealers for OTC stocks. This clearly implies that the regional exchanges
provide a real economic benefit to the capital markets in terms of greater
liquidity and superior markets for those stocks on the national exchanges
that are dual listed on one or more of the regional stock exchanges. Put
another way, the bulk of trading on the regional stock exchanges is in
dual listed stocks and this overriding function is a real benefit to the
firms and investors involved in these stocks.
INSTITUTIONS AND THE REGIONAL STOCK EXCHANGES
Pre-1969 Effect
Trading by institutions began to increase dramatically starting in
about 1965, with large increases during 1967 and 1968. During this period
of significant growth there were fixed commission charges that did not
consider the economies of scale in trading large blocks. Because of this
pricing system that was inconsistent with the economies of trading, the
well-known "give up" system developed whereby institutions instructed
their brokers to split their brokerage fee with other firms that were
providing research and sales efforts for the financial institution. As
noted in an article by Hoddeson, this fee-splitting was much easier on
most of the regional exchanges than it was on the NYSE or the ASE.
Specifically, while the NYSE would only allow fee splitting with other
members of the Exchange, most of the regional exchanges would allow
David A. Hoddeson, "Rise and Fall? Prospering Regional Exchanges
May Face Tough New Rules," Barron's (February 6, 1967).
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"give-ups" to any member of the National Association of Securities
Dealers (NASD) . This leniency in give-up distribution contributed to
substantial growth for all the regional exchanges and was a major reason
for the increase in the proportion of trading on regional stock exchanges
to be centered in dual-listed stocks. According to Hoddeson, at one point
during this period about 98 percent of total volume on the regional stock
exchanges was in dual listed stocks.
In addition, some of the regional exchanges benefitted from allow-
ing institutions to become members of the exchanges. This practice
which was initiated on the Pacific Stock Exchange allowed the institu-
tions to make further savings on trades in stocks listed on this exchange.
By 1970, 60 institutionally affiliated firms had become members of one
of the regional exchanges. ' Apparently the Midwest Stock Exchange had
the smallest institutional membership because it allowed only 50 percent
of the business to come from the institutional parent.
Finally, the regional exchanges benefitted from the growth in insti-
tutional trading because they offered economies in terms of lower taxes
12
than charged by New York City. The regional exchanges also allowed
lower commissions on direct crosses and they were more liberal regarding
13
the use of the third market when trading blocks
.
Chris Welles, "The War Between...," Op. Cit.
12
"Taxes Make Trading on the NYSE Costly," Business Week (December 8,
1975), p. 60.
13'
Chris Welles, "The War Between...," Op. Cit.
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There was some concern in 1967 because the SEC issued an order that
formally banned the use of cash give-ups and also proposed a discount in
the commission on large block trades. The NYSE supported both changes
because they would apparently be detrimental to the regional exchanges.
Post-1969 Effect
The ban against cash give-ups was implemented, but as pointed out by
Welles, it had little effect on the regionals who introduced ingenious fee-
14
splitting techniques. Specifically, the regional exchanges developed
four-way tickets that allowed brokers to pay other member brokers part of
their fee for providing execution or clearing assistance. The point is,
it appears that the regional exchanges were not seriously affected by
these changes because during this period there were still excess commis-
sions available and the regional exchanges devised ways to circumvent
the ban on cash give-ups. The success of these devices and institutional
membership can be seen in the figures in Table 1 that show that the per-
cent of trading on the regional exchanges grew steadily from 1962 through
1973.
In addition, there was an increase in volume because of the block
business done on the regional exchanges. Specifically, there were two
reasons for institutions and institutional brokers to cross a block on
a regional stock exchange rather than on the NYSE. First, the lower
transfer tax outside of New York which could make a difference on a
large trade. Second, in many instances it is contended that the block
14T,.,Ibid.
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trade will go smoother on a regional exchange because the specialist
on a regional stock exchange will not be as likely to take part of
the block to clean up some limit orders or correct his personal in-
ventory position as sometimes happens on the NYSE. Therefore, it is
speculated that block business has been maintained on the regional
exchanges
.
NEGOTIATED RATES AND REGIONAL STOCK EXCHANGES
Three Rate Changes
There were three major changes in the fixed commission rate structure
as follows
:
1. April 5, 1971: The commission on that part of an order exceed-
ing $500,000 could be negotiated between the broker and the
customer.
2. April 24, 1972: The commission on that part of an order exceed-
ing $300,000 became subject to negotiation.
3. May 1, 1975: The commission on all trades became subject to
negotiation.
Given the three changes, one can envision two alternative hypotheses
regarding the effect of the commission changes on the regional stock
exchanges
Adverse Hypothesis
The prior discussion indicated that the regional stock exchanges
enjoyed a period of strong relative growth because they allowed fee-
splitting during a time when fixed commissions on large trades by
New York Stock Exchange, Fact Book, 1976, p. 59.
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financial institutions was clearly excessive. The excess commissions
also encouraged institutions to become members of regional exchanges
and this also brought volume to these exchanges. Even after cash give-
ups were banned, the regionals devised other methods to keep the practice
alive. Finally, the regional exchanges benefitted from lewer taxes and
transfer costs because of electronic bookkeeping advances.
Obviously, if one believes that the major reason for the growth of
regional stock exchanges was the excess commissions, they would expect
that the changes to negotiated commissions would be detrimental to the
future growth and prosperity of the regional stock exchanges. With fully
negotiated commissions one should expect commissions to eventually decline
to a rate that is consistent with the costs of the transaction. Under
such conditions, there is no need to worry about fee-splitting because
there are no excess fees to split. In addition, one might expect a de-
cline in the number of institutional members on the regional exchanges
because the institutions only joined to recapture some of the excess
commissions. Once there are no excess payments it is unnecessary to
have a membership because it is possible to get a good transaction at
a competitive price without the membership. With competitive rates,
the regional stock exchanges would lose their advantages and would
be forced to compete against the NYSE on the basis of pure market-
making. Some observors have contended that under such conditions
the regional exchanges would be at a serious disadvantage because
of substantial economies of scale in trading. Based upon this line
of reasoning Doede concluded:
The solution to this situation is clear; remove the
right of the NYSE to fix prices and allow the mem-
bers of the exchange to compete with one another for
-In-
securities transactions. This would have two effects:
one, the other exchanges would probably be forced out
of business since they would not be able to operate
profitably in a competitive market, and ....
In a subsequent book West and Tinic refer extensively to Doede's
study and conclude:
Thus far the thrust of our argument has been that the
primary threat to the major exchanges comes from the
over-the-counter market. We might then ask where this
leaves the regional exchanges? The answer would ap-
pear to depend on the NYSE's policy in regard to com-
missions. If it were to move the commission structure
to the competitive level, it would almost certainly
"monopolize" the trading that does not take place in
the over-the-counter market . This would include the
trading done by rank-and-file investors as well as the
transactions made by the over-the-counter firms in the
process of evening out their positions. On the other
hand, if the Exchange were to attempt to maintain a
price somewhat higher than the competitive level, it
would provide an umbrella under which the regional ex-
changes could, perhaps, survive. In either event, how-
ever, the future of the regional exchanges, like that
of the major exchanges, seems destined to be somewhat
less than rosy . (emphasis added)
In November, 1974 a symposium was held in Los Angeles on the topic
i g
of regional stock exchanges in a central market system.
The sympmosium's purpose was to review the status at
a particular time of legislative and regulatory efforts
to facilitate the creation of such a national, central
market system, and to focus on the likely impact of
these efforts on both the near-term and longer-term
viability of regional market centers and especially
regional stock exchanges.
Robert W. Doede, "The Monopoly Power of the New York Stock Ex-
change," unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Chicago, 1967.
Richard R. West and Seha M. Tinic, The Economics of the Stock
Market (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1971), p. 221.
18
Donald E. Farrar, ed., "Regional Stock Exchanges in a Central Market
System," Explorations in Economic Research , Vol. 2, No. 3 (Summer, 1975).
19T...Ibid
. , p . vi.
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The participants included a cross section of individuals for finan-
cial institutions, the government, the regional stock exchanges, and
academic institutions. Notably, most of the strong opinions that were
expressed (most participants did not provide a strong opinion regarding
the potential outcomes) were consistent with the adverse hypothesis.
Specifically, Seymour Smidt stated:
Under current circumstances, I would expect the elimi-
nation of fixed commissions on brokerage services to
substantially reduce the volume of trading done_on
regional stock exchanges and the third market.
Even the presidents of three of the regional stock exchanges were
generally pessimistic regarding the outlook for their exchanges as a
result of negotiated commissions without a central market (i.e., they
generally felt they would be able to compete when the attributes of a
central market was implemented). Specifically, Elkins Wetherill,
president of the Philadelphia Stock Exchange stated:
Another detriment to the continuation of the regionals
during this near-term period will be the lack of re-
ciprocal business. With fully negotiated rates recipro-
cal business probably will dry up; this has always been
a great source of volume for the regional exchanges.
Likewise G. Robert Ackerman, president of the Pacific Stock Exchange
discussed some positive benefits from the central market, but regarding
negotiated commissions, stated:
The fourth element of the central market system is
negotiated rates. This is the one area that we see
as detrimental to regional exchanges, including the
Pacific. It is detrimental because we expect a loss
Ibid
. , p . vi
.
2X
Ibid
., p. 392.
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of business due to the reciprocal aspects that Elkins
Wetherill touched on a few minutes ago, and we see a
reduction, in the number of firms doing brokerage
business.
Finally, James E. Dowd, president of the Boston Stock Exchange,
stated:
As both Elkins and Bob indicated, we feel that fully
unfixed rates will have a negative impact on incen-
tives for regional exchange membership.
In summary, a number of very knowledgeable observors felt that the
imposition of fully negotiated commissions would have an adverse impact
on the relative trading volume for the regional stock exchanges compared
to the volume for the two national exchanges, especially the NYSE.
No Effect Hypothesis
One might contend that the regional exchanges have grown and pros-
pered because of the market-making of their specialists and because of
their innovative electronic record-keeping and transfer arrangements.
Also, Hoddeson pointed out that the regional exchanges were more liberal
regarding the use of the third market for block trades. Finally, it is
contended that it is often easier and cheaper to cross block trades on a
regional stock exchange. If these conditions are present and dominant,
then the change in the commission structure should have little effect
on the regional exchanges. In addition, one might speculate that the
growth of the regional exchanges was due to activity in dual listed
stocks from regional brokers who had no choice but to go to the regional
22
Ibid., p. 397.
23
Ibid., pp. 397-98,
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stock exchange. For regional brokers it is inconsequential whether rates
become negotiated— they will continue to take orders from their customers
in dual listed stocks to the regional stock exchanges whenever possible.
Therefore, if one believes that the growth of the regional stock ex-
changes is due to innovation, flexibility, good block trading practices,
and the growth of regional broker members, they would expect the change
in commission structure to have no major effect on the regional stock
24
exchanges.
Another factor that could affect the results that is not connected
to negotiated commissions was the complete implementation of the consol-
idated tape for all NYSE stocks in June, 1975 and for all ASE stocks in
early 1976. With the consolidated tape all transactions for stocks
listed on the NYSE or the ASE are reported on the tape irrespective of
where they are traded. Therefore, a trade in General Motors on the Mid-
west Stock Exchange would be reported the same as a comparable trade on
the NYSE. During the initial period the trades indicated on the exchange
where the transaction took place. Notably, almost all observors felt
that this change would be beneficial to the regional stock exchanges be-
cause it would increase the awareness of the exchanges by market observors
,
Tests of Hypotheses
The tests entail an analysis of the trends in relative trading for
relevant time periods. Specifically, since the three major changes in
24
For a discussion of some of these factors and a brief analysis
of the regional exchanges, see "The Regional Stock Exchanges Fight for
Survival," Fortune (November, 1973).
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coinmission rates have taken place since 1971 there is an analysis of
changes in the relative trading over time for each of the exchanges
(national and regional) since 1970. The cata examined is monthly trad-
ing data for the period January, 1970 through December, 1977 (96 monthly
observations). The analysis considers relative trading for each of the
exchanges defined as the dollar value of trading on a specified exchange
as a percent of the dollar value of trading on all registered exchanges.
Figures are also reported for relative trading in shares, but these re-
sults are typically not discussed because most of the results would not
change and such a discussion would add considerably to the length of the
study.
The time series of relative tracing for the following stock exchanges
are examined:
1. American Stock Exchange (ASE)
2. Boston Stock Exchange (BSE)
3. Cincinnati Stock Exchange (CSE)
4. Detroit Stock Exchange (DSE)
5. Midwest Stock Exchange (MWSE)
6. New York Stock Exchange (NYSE)
7
.
Pacific Stock Exchange (PSE)
8. Philadelphia Stock Exchange (PHSE)
9. 3SE-MWSE-PSE-PHSE (Combined)
The last combination is considered the major regional exchanges.
-19-
ANALYSIS OF RESULTS
For each of the nine series there is an analysis of the trend in
relative trading using the following model.
R'f. = a. + b. Time + e.it 1 1 l
RT - relative trading on exchange i during period t
a. - constant term for exchange i
b. - slope coefficient for exchange i
Time - the monthly time variable for the period of analysis
e. - the random error term for exchange i
The analysis centers on the value and significance of the b.
coefficient. The adverse hypothesis would expect that this slope coeffi-
cient would be negative and significant for the various regional stock
exchanges after the changes in commission structure, while this coeffi-
cient would be positive and significant for the two national exchanges,
especially the NYSE. In contrast, the no effect hypothesis would expect
this slope coefficient to be insignificantly different from zero (i.e.,
no slope) for all the exchanges. Obviously, a positive slope for any
of the regional exchanges would likewise support the no effect hypothesis
because it would indicate chat the regional stock exchanges had gained
in relative trading activity during this period.
-20-
April, 1971 to December, 1977
The results for the period following the first change until December,
25
1977 are contained in Table 3. ' Overall these results are mixed. There
is some support for the adverse hypothesis since two of the regional
exchanges had significant negative slopes (DSE and PHSE) and the NYSE
had a very significant positive slope during this period. At the same
time, the no effect hypothesis receives support because the slope for
the PSE was negative but not significant and the slopes for the BSE,
CSE, and MSE were all positive and significant. Likewise the slope for
the combined regional exchanges was negative but insignificant. Also,
the slope coefficient for the second national exchange (the ASE) was
significant and negative.
May, 1972 to December, 1977
The regression results for this time period are contained in Table 4.
Again the results are mixed but tend to provide support for the adverse
hypothesis. Specifically, three of the regional exchanges (BSE, DSE, and
PHSE) had significant negative slopes and the combined regional exchange
regression had a significant negative slope. Also, the NYSE regression
had a large significantly positive slope. The only evidence in support
of the no effect hypothesis is a significant positive slope for the CSE,
a positive but insignificant slope for the MSE, and a negative but in-
significant slope for the PSE. Also, the ASE slope is significantly
negative.
25
This trend regression was run for the total period January, 1970
to December, 1977 and the results are almost identical to those reported
in Table 3.
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TABLE 3
REGRESSION RESULTS FOR STOCK TRADING
REGRESSED AGAINST TIME
TIME PERIOD: APRIL 1971 THRU DECEMBER 1977
Dollar Value Shares Traded
Slope T-Val _ Slope T-Val .
Constant Coeff SI Coeff R Constant Coeff SI Coeff R
ASE 26.469 -0.088 -11.42 0.623 44.051 -0.137 -14.33 0.722
BSE 0.398 0.002 1.92 0,004 0.024 0.003 3.83 0.156
CSE -2.109 0.010 13.69 0.704 -1.876 0.009 13.41 0.695
DSE 0.897 -0.003 -11.44 0.624 0.775 -0.003 -11.35 0.620
MSE 2.225 0.010 3.75 0.151 3.369 0.003 1.01 0.013
NYSE 62.130 0.087 10.94 0.602 44.101 0.141 13.94 0.711
PSE 4.225 -0.003 -1.52 0.028 3.414 0.001 0.55 0.004
PHSE 5.584 -0.015 -9.79 0.548 4.706 -0.012 -8.02 0.449
Comb 12.542 -0.006 -1.49 0.027 11.524 -0.006 -1.37 0.023
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TABLE A
REGRESSION RESULTS FOR STOCK TRADING
REGRESSED AGAINST TIME
TIME PERIOD: MAY 1972 THRU DECEMBER 1977
Dollar Value Shares Traded
Slope T-Val Slope T-Val .
Constant Coeff SI Coeff R Constant Coeff SI Coeff R
-7.21 0.441 36.222 -0.106 -9.93 0.599
-1.91 0.052 0.765 0.000 0.08 0.001
14.37 0.758 -2.497 0.011 14.03 0.748
-12.17 0.692 0.982 -0.004 -12.61 0.700
1.62 0.038 4.610 -0.002 -0.67 0.004
7.37 0.452 48.312 0.124 9.66 0.585
-1.50 0.033 4.034 -0.001 -0.60 0.001
-11.04 0.649 5.906 -0.017 -9.68 0.582
-4.15 0.207 15.323 -0.021 -4.46 0.237
ASE 19.571 -0.060
BSE 1.652 -0.003
CSE -2.805 0.013
DSE 1.123 -0.004
MSE 3.237 0.006
NYSE 66,017 0.072
PSE 4.427 -0.003
PHSE 6.599 -0.019
Comb 15.920 -0.019
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In summary, the results are again mixed but on balance tend to pro-
vide support for the adverse effect hypothesis because the combined ex-
change slope coefficient is significantly negative and the NYSE slope
is significantly positive.
May, 1975 to December, 1977
The results for the two-and-a-half year period following "May Day"
are contained in Table 5. While the results are again mixed, the bulk of
the evidence supports the no effect hypothesis. Only two of the regional
exchanges had significant negative coefficients (BSE and DSE) . All the
other regional exchanges had significant positive coefficients (CSE) or
insignificant coefficients (MSE, PSE, and FUSE), and the coefficient for
the combined regional stock exchanges was insignificant. In addition,
the. slope coefficient for the NYSE was negative and significant, although
the ASE was positive and significant. The shares traded results were
consistent except that tha ASE and NYSE slope coefficients were both
insignificant
.
In summary, the results were mixed but on balance supported the no
effect hypothesis because of the preponderance of positive or insignifi-
cant coefficients for the regional stock exchanges and the significant
negative coefficient for the NYSE.
Mean Percents Over Time
In addition to the analysis of the trends, Table 6 contains data on
the means and standard deviation of percent trading for alternative non-
overlapping periods during 1970-1977. The four subperiods coincide with
the period prior to commission changes, the periods following each of the
-24-
TABLE 5
REGRESSION RESULTS FOR STOCK TRADING
REGRESSED AGAINST TIME
TIME PERIOD: MAY 1975 THRU DECEMBER 1977
Dollar Value Shares Traded
Constant
Slope
Coeff
T-Val
SI Coeff R2 Constant
Slope
Coeff
T-Val
SI Coeff R2
ASE -4.759 0.034 3.10 0.242 5.716 0.012 0.62 0.013
BSE 5.557 -0.018 -7.69 0.663 3.424 -0.010 -3.90 0.336
CSE -5.514 0.023 9.45 0.748 -5.010 0.021 9.29 0.742
DSE 1.076 -0.004 -9.75 0.760 1.002 -0.004 -9.71 0.759
MSE 2.150 0.010 0.69 0.016 2.200 0.007 0.53 0.009
NYSE 95.712 -0.043 -2.07 0.125 89.620 -0.035 -1.29 0.053
PSE 3.497 0.000 0.05 0.001 2.087 0.006 0.90 0.026
PHSE 2.297 -0.002 -0.50 0.008 1.615 -0.001 -0.12 0.001
Comb 13.516 -0.010 -0.64 0.013 9.298 0.002 0.16 0.001
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TABLE 6
MEAN AND STANDARD DEVIATION OF PERCENT TRADING
(DOLLAR VALUE) DURING ALTERNATIVE TIME PERIODS:
JANUARY, 1970-DECEMBER, 1977
1/70-3/71
(15 months)
4/71-
(13 mc
-4/72
mths)
5/72-4/75
(35 months)
5/75-12/77
(32 months)
Mean
$ Value
Std.
Dev.
Mean
$ Value
Std.
Dev.
Mean
$ Value
Std.
Dev.
Mean
$ Value
Std.
Dev.
ASE 10.51 2.08 10.21 1.08 5.71 0.96 4.01 0.57
BSE 0.67 0.12 0.62 0.12 1.08 0.12 0.92 0.12
CSE 0.04 0.02 0.04 0.02 0.07 0.02 0.53 0.13
DSE 0.12 0.02 0.20 0.05 0.21 0.04 0.03 0.02
MSE 3.51 0.85 4.00 0.26 4.56 0.40 4.72 0.74
NYSE 79.12 2.07 78.80 0.75 82.41 0.90 84.53 1.08
PSE 3.93 0.44 3.68 0.24 3.62 0.30 3.60 0.38
PHSE 2.12 0.34 2.39 0.38 2.31 0.24 1.66 0.26
Comb. 10.22 1.24 10.74 0.56 11.58 0.69 10.89 0.83
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first two changes, and finally the period after "May Day." The results
are best discussed in terms of individual exchanges.
The mean percents for the ASE indicate a steady significant decline
from over 10 percent to about 4 percent. The BSE experienced a peak.
prior to May Day followed by an insignificant decline. Overall the BSE
results indicated an increase for the period prior to commission changes
to the period after May Day although there was a decline since May Day.
The CSE began from an extremely small base, but has clearly experienced
a significant increase in the percent of trading during the total period.
In contrast, the DSE appeared to be doing well prior to May Day, but
then the percent began to steadily decline from May, 1975 to March, 1976
and averaged only 0.09 percent during this period. Finally, in May,
1976 the DSE announced it would close as of June 30. It is stated
in the WSJ article:
The Detroit exchange experienced its busiest period dur-
ing the late 1960's wrien large institutions took advan-
tage of a commission structure on the regional exchanges
that was looser than that at the New York Stock Exchange.
But when competitive rates were established on the New
York Stock-Exchange, the regional exchanges lost a key
advantage.
Therefore, the effect was clearly severe on the DSE. Another contrast
to this dismal effect was provided by the MSE that experienced a small
but steady increase in the percent of trading during the four subperiods
going from about 3.5 percent to 4.7 percent. Even while the BSE, CSE,
"Detroit Exchange Says It Will Close June 30, Cites Lagging
Volume," Wall Street Journal (May 17, 1976).
27
0p. Cit.
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and MSE were gaining so was the NYSE. As shown, there was a slight de-
cline on the NYSE during the 1971-72 period, but clear increases during
the latter periods such that the percent of trading on the NYSE during
the time after May Day exceeded all prior periods and the NYSE ended the
period with a dominant 85 percent of all trading. These results for the
NYSE alone would tend to support the adverse effect hypothesis because
they indicate strong growth for this national exchange. The results for
the PSE indicate a steady but insignificant decline in the percent of
trading which is consistent with the insignificant trend variable. The
PHSE experienced a small increase in the proportion of trading after the
initial commission changes, but has experienced a definite decline fol-
lowing May Day.
Therefore, the results for the six regional exchanges are again best
described as mixed since three regional exchanges experienced very con-
sistent increases (BSE, CSE, and MSE), two exchanges experienced insig-
nificant declines (PSE and PHSE), and one exchange (DSE) went out of
business. Overall, the results for the combined regional exchanges pro-
vide support for the no effect hypothesis because the mean percent of
trading since May Day exceeded the percent during the two earliest
periods but was below. the mean just prior to May Day.
These apparently contradictory results which show the NYSE exper-
iencing an overall gain and tha composite of regional exchanges likewise
experiencing an overall gain ace explained by the significant decline
experienced by the ASE during this total time period. Apparently both
sets of exchanges experienced ,jains at the expense of the ASE, with the
NYSE deriving most of the increase.
-28-
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION
Summary
It is generally acknowledged that the regional stock exchanges are
an important part of our total equity market structure because of the
liquidity they provide for small firms not eligible for listing on one
of the national exchanges and also the added liquidity and competition
for large firms that are dual listed. With the imposition of fully com-
petitive commissions, an important question concerns the effect of this
change on these regional stock exchanges. It is possible to propose two
contrasting hypotheses. The adverse effect hypothesis contends that the
regional exchanges experienced growth since 1965 because they provided
a convenient vehicle to distribute the excess commissions paid by insti-
tutions during the era of fixed commissions. Therefore, when commissions
became competitive some observors expected a significant shift in trading
activity to the NYSE because of the perceived economies of scale in
marketmaking . In contrast, those who advocate a no effect hypothesis
contended that the regional exchanges had developed strong marketmaking
capabilities, provided efficient, low-cost trading facilities, and were
preferred by many block traders. Therefore, these observors would not
expect a major change in the proportion of trading done on the regional
stock exchanges after the commission changes.
The tests involved a detailed analysis of the proportion of dollar
and shares traded during the subperiods surrounding the changes in the
commission structure. There were two sets of tests. The first set
examined the trend of activity for alternative subperiods. The second
-29-
set of tests examined the mean percent of trading for the alternative
regional exchanges compared to the trading on the two national exchanges.
The results are best described as mixed in terms of the effect on
individual regional stock exchanges, and also mixed regarding the overall
hypotheses. Specifically, three regional exchanges experienced an in-
crease in relative trading activity, two regional exchanges held about
even with some signs of weakness, while one regional stock exchange went
out of business. Overall, the combined results for the four major re-
gional exchanges support the no effect hypothesis because the percent
of trading after May Day was above the percent prior to any changes in
commission. At the same time, the results for the NYSE support the ad-
verse effect hypothesis because the proportion of trading on the NYSE
also increased as shown by most trend coefficients ana the mean trading
values
.
These contrasting results are explained by the losses in relative
trading experienced by the ASE during this period. Notably, the NYSE
seemed to gain most of what was lost by the ASE.
Conclusion
Although the results have been consistently mixed, the authors feel
that on balance the results support the no effect hypothesis as related
to the regional stock exchanges because the overall trend for the combined
group is insignificantly different from zero and the overall percent of
trading on the regional stock exchanges was slightly higher after May Day
than at the beginning of the period. This conclusion must be tempered
because the NYSE results likewise indicate gains during the overall period,
but a small decline since May Day.
-30-
Given the numerous, well-informecl observors who generally expected
the Imposition of negotiated commissions to adversely impact on the
regional stock exchanges, these results are somewhat surprising. This
is especially true since negotiated commissions were quite detrimental
to the third market. Ad earlier study by one of the authors indicated
that the third market suffered a severe decline following the commission
?8
changes and currently is best described as defunct. One might contend
that the regional stock exchanges have unique marketmaking capabilities
separate from the NYSE and this capability was highlighted by the in-
troduction of the consolidated tape in June, 1975. A study by Garbade
and Silber examined the price effects on some dual traded stocks after
the consolidated tape was introduced and concluded that the time-price
relationships indicated that the timely reports of regional exchange
29
transactions began to affect the pricing of New York trades.
Therefore, one might speculate that the benefits of the consolidated
tape offset the adverse effects of fully negotiated commissions. The
point is, it appears that the regional stock exchanges have survived
this major market change in the short-run. Whether they will be able
to survive and prosper in the long-run and continue to provide added
liquidity and competition remains to be seen.
28
Frank K. Reilly, "Negotiated Commissions and the Third Market,"
university of Illinois, Working Paper No. 429 (August, 1977).
29
Kenneth D. Garbade and William L. Silber, "Dually Traded Secur-
ities: A Study of Dominant and Satellite Markets," Salomon Brothers
Center for the Study of Financial Institutions, Working Paper No. 112
(March, 1977).
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